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RADHA D'SOUZA*
This article interrogates the methodological lenses through which law in the Third World
is commonly analyzed in socio-legal studies. Third World socio-Legal studies, this article
argues, is a field in search of philosophical foundations. It continues to rely on conceptual
categories and analytical frameworks developed through the intellectual, cultural, and social
histories of Western capitalist societies, which it extends uncriticaly to different intersubjective
orders in Third World contexts. The article examines the common grounds shared by two
apparently competing discourses about law in the Third World, which I label imperial
agendas and global solidarities. It is difficult to speak about the Third World without becoming
mired in conceptual contradictions. One reason for the methodological problems in Third
World socio-legal studies is that social philosophy, and liberal philosophy in particular,
undermines the concept of society. This article begins by examining the meaning of society
in social philosophy. It then interrogates three dichotomous sets of analytical frameworks
that are often invoked in Third World socio-Legal studies: (a] comparative law versus Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAILI; (b) economic or modern law versus cultural
or traditional law; and (c) state centralism versus legal pluralism. The article argues for a
differentiated understanding of society at the ontological, structural, and empirical levels,
which should help transcend binary approaches and facilitate theoretical reflections about
the Third World without subsuming its specificities. The article concludes by arguing for a
sustained research program to put Third World Socio-legal Studies on firm methodological
foundations.
Cet article tente de comprendre [a lorgnette m~thodologique A travers laquelle les 6tudes
socio-juridiques analysent habituellement le droit du Tiers-Monde. Selon ['article, les
6tudes socio-juridiques du Tiers-Monde constituent un domaine en qu6te de fondements
philosophiques. E~les continuent de s'appuyer sur des cat6gories conceptuelles et des struc-
tures analytiques d6coulant du patrimoine intelLectuel, culturel. et social des soci6t~s capi-
talistes occidentales, qu'elles appliquent sans discernement A divers rapports intersubjec-
tifs dans des contextes tiers-mondistes. Larticle examine les assises partag6es par deux
* School of Law, University of Westminster. I wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers for
their valuable feedback. Their input has been used to improve the original draft.
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discours apparemment contradictoires traitant du droit tiers-mondiste, que je qualifierais
de vis6es imp6rialistes d'une part et de solidarit6 mondiale d'autre part. It est difficile de
s'entretenirdu Tiers-Monde sans s'enliser dans une mer de contradictions conceptuelles.
Lune des raisons qui sous-tendent les probl6mes m6thodologiques des 6tudes socio-
juridiques du Tiers-Monde est le fait que [a philosophie sociale-et plus particuLirement La
philosophie lib6rale- 6branle le concept-m6me de soci6t6. Larticle commence paranalyser
[a signification du concept de soci6t6 en philosophie sociale. II examine ensuite trois ensembles
dichotomiques de structures analytiques qu'invoquent souvent les 6tudes socio-juridiques
du Tiers-Monde : a) le droit compar6 par rapport aux th6ories tiers-mondistes du droit inter-
national (TWAIL], b) le droit moderne fond6 sur ['6conomie par rapport au droit traditionnel
fond6 sur [a culture et cJ le centralisme d'6tat par rapport au pluralisme juridique. Larticle
milite en faveur d'une interpr6tation diff6renci6e de [a soci6t6 sur les plans ontologique,
structurel. et empirique, qui devrait permettre de transcender les approches dichotomiques
et faciliter les r6flexion th6oriques sur le Tiers-Monde sans faire abstraction de ses particu-
larit6s. It propose pourterminer [a cr6ation d'un programme continu de recherche destin6
6 doter de soLides fondments m6thodologiques les 6tudes socio-juridiques du Tiers-Monde.
I. W H A T IS S O C IE T Y ? .............................................................................................................................. 1 1
II. W HAT IS 'ASIAN ' ABOUT LAW IN ASIA? .......................................................................................... 19
Ill. TRADITIONAL IN CULTURE AND MODERN IN ECONOMY? .......................................................... 24
IV. LEGAL PLURALISM, CENTRALISM, AND THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES ........................................... 31
V . C O N C L U S IO N ...................................................................................................................................... 3 7
THIRD WORLD SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES (TWSLS) is a field of study in search of
philosophical foundations.1 This is so notwithstanding the large body of
scholarship--comprising both dominant and critical pieces-on different aspects
of the operation of law in Third World societies. Necessarily generalizing,
scholarship on law and colonialism and on law and development in various
academic disciplines highlights the temporal and spatial dimensions of law in
Third World societies.2 More recently, the emphasis on governance in international
1. I use the term in the broadest possible sense as a field of study that examines law in Third
World societies and includes sociological, historical, and anthropological approaches as
well as policy studies and impact analysis. For distinctions between socio-legal studies
and sociology of law and the use of these terms in the United States, Canada, and United
Kingdom, see Joan Brockman, "The Impact of Institutional Structures and Power on Law
and Society: Is It Time for Reawakening?" (2003) 37 Law & Soc'y Rev 283.
2. For a review of literature on law and colonialism, see Sally Engle Merry, "Law and
Colonialism" (1991) 25 Law & Soc'y Rev 889 [Engle Merry, "Law and Colonialism"]; Sally
Engle Merry, "Colonial Law and Its Uncertainties" (2010) 28 LHR 1067 [Engle Merry,
"Uncertainties"]. For a brief overview of the themes in law and development, see John
Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris, eds, Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the
21st Century (London: Cavendish, 2003). For an overview of sociological approaches to
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organizations such as the World Bank has produced a critique of international
law and international relations from the perspective of global justice.3 This
impressive body of scholarship has not, however, produced new innovations in
conceptual categories in social philosophy. It remains by and large a descriptive
and discursive account of law in Third World societies. Analytical frameworks
and conceptual categories provide the prisms through which law in societies is
understood. Categories that emphasize structuring mechanisms like class, capital,
state, and political economy or subject formation like identity, gender, race, and
culture remain, by and large, products of Greco-Roman-Christian intellectual
traditions that have evolved through the experiences of Euro-American capitalist
societies. TWSLS demands much more than sociological attention to contexts.
It challenges us to think about the intersubjectivity of the social contexts, i.e.,
the cognitive mappings embedded in language and culture, that are constitutive
of different civilisations or what Jdirgen Habermas refers to as "lifeworlds."4 To
put it differently, the development of theory and philosophy continues to borrow,
modify, extend, advance, develop, and adapt various concepts and methods from
different philosophical strands in the Greco-Roman-Christian intellectual
traditions, and the Third World societies provide the historical facts or the social
data that differentiate the context for the operation of law. If, as critical legal
scholars rightly argue,5 the conceptual categories and analytical methods of law
international law, see Sally Engle Merry, "International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship:
Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism" (2008) 41 Stud Law, Politics & Soc'y 149. For
a range of approaches to TWSLS and globalization, see the special issue of the Harvard
International Law Journal Symposium, "Comparative Visions of Global Public Order"
(2005) 46 Harv Int'l LJ 388. On the disciplinary scope of sociology of transnational law, see
Lawrence M Friedman, "Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law" (1996)
32 Stan J Int'l L 65. For methodological issues in sociolegal studies generally, see Christine B
Harrington & Barbara Yngvesson, "Interpretative Sociolegal Research" (1990) 15 Law & Soc
Inquiry 135.
3. See e.g. Philip Alston, "Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of Human Rights
and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals"
(2005) 27 Hum Rts Q755; David P Fidler, "A Kinder, Gender System of Capitulations?
International Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal Globalized
Civilization" (2000) 35 Tex Int'l LJ 387; Lucy Williams, ed, International Poverty Law. An
Emerging Discourse (London: Zed Books, 2006). See also the works referenced in ibid.
4. Jfirgen Habermas, The theory of communicative action: Reason and the Rationalization of Sociely,
vol 1, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989); Jilrgen Habermas,
The theory of communicative action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, vol
2, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989).
5. For a review of literature see Engle Merry, "Law and Colonialism," supra note 2; for historical
aspects see Diane Krikby & Catherine Coleborne, eds, Law, history, colonialism: The Reach of
the Empire (Manchester, NY Manchester University Press, 2001); for conceptual aspects see
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have a profound role in colonialism and the inequities of development in Third
World societies, should those categories and methods not be called into question?
And how can we call them into question without, on the one hand, subsuming
the differences between First and Third World societies, as meta-theories with
their universal categories and methods tend to do, or on the other hand,
undermining the possibility of theory, as postmodern postcolonial emphasis of
difference and pluralism tends to do?
One reason why critical understandings of law in Third World societies have
not pushed the boundaries of concept formation and theory development is
the opacity of the meaning of "society" in contemporary social philosophy.
Consequently, the epistemological premise ofTWSLS rests on a fault line between
philosophical understandings of society, on one hand, and the law that has
operated in Third World societies since the advent of colonialism, on the other.
This rupture is not adequately captured in TWSLS. Nor are the methodological
ramifications of the disjuncture between intersubjective orders and geo-historical
realities adequately theorized in TWSLS. If concepts are socially produced in
response to geo-historical developments, then it must be acknowledged, in
principle at least, that transposing conceptual categories developed in one
geo-historical context to another-a method entailed in the universal application
of theory-poses methodological questions for TWSLS. Conversely, emphasizing the
effects of modern law on Third World societies without adequately understanding
the intersubjective, geo-historical, and sociological sources of those effects
obfuscates the theory and concepts implicit in those accounts. The epistemological
gaps in TWSLS that follow from the fault line mirror a wider problem in social
theory. Social philosophy since the Enlightenment and Modernity has conflated
the ontological, epistemological, sociological, and empirical meanings of society,
as elaborated in Part I below.' Equally, the singular influence of Greco-Roman-
Christian intellectual traditions has meant that social philosophy is dominated by
dualist methods and binary categories that lock theory and practice in adversarial
positions.
The epistemological gaps have created paradoxes for TWSLS. Ex-facie dominant
TWSLS advances imperial agendas and critical TWSLS advances global solidarities.
Bernard S Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: 7he British in India (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
6. For an historical understanding of Modernity, see JPS Uberoi, 7he European Modernity:
Science, Truth and Method (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) at ch 2; for the
distinction between Modernity and Enlightenment, see Javeed Alam, "Modernity and Its
Philosophic Visions" in KN Panikkar, TV Byres & Utsa Patnaik, eds, The Making ofHistory:
Essays Presented to Irfan Habib (New Delhi: Tulika, 2000) 405.
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In philosophical terms, dominant TWSLS and critical TWSLS appear as mirror
images of each other in that they share common theoretical grounds but proceed
from different vantage points. The development of TWSLS remains thwarted by
binary concepts and frameworks. Popular binaries in TWSLS include modern
versus traditional or customary law, economics versus culture, and legal centralism
versus pluralism. The binary lenses through which law in Third World societies
is studied are effective insofar as they help to deconstruct the operation of law.
Beyond that, TWSLS is trapped in conceptual and political conundrums. The
resulting deadlock is particularly problematic for global solidarity movements
that are motivated by the desire to overcome the impasse of Eurocentrism in
theory and promote law as a transformative tool for global justice in the widest
possible sense.
In the Parts that follow, these issues are examined at greater length. Part
I locates the epistemological gaps in TWSLS in the opacity of the meaning of
society in social theory generally. The opacity of the concept of society makes
articulation of the differences between First and Third World societies possible
only in dualist, often adversarial ways and in binary terms. Using the meaning of
society in social philosophy as the point of departure highlights theoretical and
methodological problems in TWSLS that follow from that opacity. Parts II, III,
and IV unpack three binary sets of analytical frameworks popular in TWSLS,
each set made up of a dominant and a critical approach: (a) comparative law
versus Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL); (b) economic
or modern law versus cultural or traditional law; and (c) legal centralism versus
legal pluralism.
Part II examines comparative law, which is the dominant framework for
TWSLS, by interrogating the idea of Asian law and juxtaposing the comparative
law approach with TWAIL a movement committed to promoting Third World
perspectives in international law. Part III widens the scope of the comparative
law/TWAIL approaches to examine the divide between economics and culture
in TWSLS-a dichotomy closely related to the first but with longer and more
enduring roots in colonial history. I use the public/private divide in law to
interrogate the ways in which the use of legal concepts sustain specific types of
relations between economies and cultures that have come to characterise Third
World societies. I argue that there are asymmetries in the language of law and
its meanings in particular social contexts, in the substance and form of law, in
the abstract legal concepts, and in the historical contexts in which they were
introduced and evolved in Third World societies.
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Part IV interrogates the underpinnings of the economic/cultural divide
in TWSLS by examining legal centralism and legal pluralism, two popular
frameworks of analysis in dominant and critical TWSLS respectively, and by
evaluating them against the specific attributes of societies constituted through
processes of imperialism or colonialism. In the concluding Part, I return to the
importance of problematizing society as a core concept in social theory in order
to transcend binary frameworks. The methodological questions discussed in this
article are deeply embedded in TWSLS scholarship. The aim of this article is to open up
entrenched approaches for wider engagement and to advocate for a research program
that will place TWSLS on firmer philosophical and theoretical foundations.
I. WHAT IS SOCIETY?
There is considerable semantic confusion in the social sciences and humanities on the
appropriate vocabulary to characterize societies with histories of imperial rule. Binary terms
like First World and Third World, North and South, developed and underdeveloped,
colonial and neo-colonial (or postcolonial), and West and East are often used to describe
societies but are widely contested from different theoretical, ideological, and disciplinary
perspectives. While most people understand what is being referred to when such terms
are used, the conceptual underpinnings of the terms are often imprecise and inaequate
to identify appropriate criteria for classifying these types of societies.' Is it possible that the
semantic confusion is due to the opaque meaning of society in social theory?
7. The continued use of the term 'Third World' has been called into question. See e.g. Arif
Dirlik, "Spectres of the Third World: Global Modernity and the End of the Three Worlds"
(2004) 25 Third World Q 131. The term is also defended, inter alia, on the grounds that
it is still a useful term. See e.g. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Newness, Imperialism, and
International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall
LJ 171. Mark Berger asserts that there are historical associations with the term that are
important. See e.g. Mark T Berger, "After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of
Third Worldism" (2004) 25 Third World Q 9. In addition to these reasons, I use the term
Third World for a third, more important reason. The historical factors that led to the creation
of the 'three worlds'-capitalist (first world), socialist (second world), and (semi)colonial
(third world)-and that formed the structural feature of the post-World War II world order
continue to inform the historical, structural, political, economic, and cultural realities of
those societies. These features remain even after 'Third Worldism' as a solidarity movement
of newly independent countries has stalled and the formal architecture of the world order
appears to be subsumed by 'globalization.' Throughout this article the term 'First World' is
used to denote European societies that were internally reconstituted through the processes
of capitalism and informed by corresponding intellectual developments spearheaded by the
European Enlightenment.
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Tom Bottomore's A Dictionary ofJMarxist Though? defines three uses of the
word society: as socialized human beings, as typologies of social formations, and
as specific societies. What is important is not to reduce the concept of society
to one of these three definitions, but rather to treat all three uses as true and ask
ourselves, "What must be the nature of society if all three definitions are
true?" Methodologically, such an approach borrows from the non-dualist
Jaina traditions of Anekantavada or the philosophy of non-one-sidedness."
Anekantavada methods urge us not to frame questions in the "either this is true or
it is false" format, but rather to ask, "If A believes this to be true, and B believes it
to be false, what must be the nature of reality that invites both beliefs?"
The methodological approach in Anekantavada presupposes an ontological
conception of the nature of Reality that informs epistemological inquiries. In
this article, "Reality" (with initial capital) denotes the ontological meaning of the
term in the philosophical and cosmological sense that there is a Reality beyond
individual spatio-temporal lives, while "reality" (all lower case) denotes the
ordinary use of the term to refer to objective existence beyond subjective
perceptions as when we speak of social, political, or economic realities. In the
Jaina conception, Reality is infinite and irreducible. 0 In the Buddhist conceptions,
Reality is interdependent, contingent and non-essential.11 The role of epistemology is to
uncover layers of Reality and real relations, metaphorically like peeling an onion.
Liberal theory, to the contrary, is based on what Roy Bhaskar calls a "monova-
lent" 12 ontology, where the world is reducible, unchanging, and undifferentiated.
Bottomore's three uses of "society' may be seen as three levels of meaning, each
of which is represented in this article by a different typographical convention: at
the ontological level, where human beings are socialized beings and human life is
contingent on Society; at the structural level, where Society refers to typologies of
geo-historical social formations constituted by a variety of mechanisms (such as
capitalism, imperialism, feudalism, or mercantilism); and at the empirical level,
where society (usually presented in the plural)refers to specific conjunctures of
diverse social, economic, historical, political, and cultural factors and the roles of
individuals and groups that characterize specific societies at a given point in time.
8. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) at 448-50.
9. For a range of perspectives on the method of Anekantavada, see Nagin J Shah, ed, Jaina 7heory
ofMultiple Facets of Reality and Truth (Anekantavada) (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000).
10. Ibid
11. David J Kalupahana, Nagarjuna: Philosophy ofthe Middle Way (Albany: University of New
York Press, 1986).
12. The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences
(New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979).
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In this article, therefore, Society denotes the ontological level of meaning, Society
the structural, and society or societies the third, empirical level.
Taking philosophy of science as his point of departure, Roy Bhaskar argues
that Nature, Society, and "Human Life" (individuals and groups) are ontologically
distinct in that they possess different ontological attributes and properties, but
that they are nevertheless related.13 Society is unilaterally contingent on Nature
but the converse is not true in that Nature can exist without Society (as on Mars,
for example). Society, as social structures, Bhaskar argues, is always geo-historically
produced and involves language, concepts, laws, institutions, technology, norms,
and ideologies. The ontological property of human life is its psychological and aesthetic
dimension, a property of being human. It gives human beings agency and the
capacity to change societies at the empirical level in the short term. Human Life
is contingent on Society in that everyone is born into some type of social structure
without which life is not possible; yet human agency can transform Society at
the structural level in the long term. Society thus has dual ontological properties:
It is the condition of Human Life, in Bhaskar's terms, and at the same time can
be transformed by it. Human Life is concept-dependent and impelled by the
desire to be free from the constraints imposed by social structures. Human beings
must therefore always rethink philosophy and theory for transformative action.
Bhaskar's pluralist ontology makes it possible to develop a non-dualist epistemology
that can provide a coherent account of natural, social, and aesthetic life. It allows
for the possibility of theory without subsuming difference.
At the ontological level, it is possible to argue that Society is the structured
relationship of Nature and Human Life; it is the ontological median between the
two, as it were. The ontological attributes of Society make it possible to postulate
different types of societies that are specific geo-historical conjunctures of natures
and peoples-in other words, social structures formed through geo-historical
processes. The social structures including law, institutions, norms, and cultures,
for example, constrain and enable those living within those structures in different
ways. At the human level of individuals and groups, transformative action and
solidarities become possible if and only if knowledge is driven by empirical
realities, takes into account structural causes, and is foregrounded in ontological
awareness, i.e., in awareness of one's philosophical world view about the nature of
Reality grounded in conceptions of cosmology and ontology.14
13. Roy Bhaskar Reclaiming Reality.. A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (London:
Verso, 1989) at 76-83.
14. For a discussion of activism and ontology, see Radha D'Souza, "What Can Activist Scholars
Learn from Rum?" 64 Philosophy East and West [forthcoming in 2014].
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Liberal philosophy, which continues to be the dominant philosophy in law
and social theory, is dismissive of the concept of Society. Society, following
William Outhwaite,15 is not an empirical concept; it is a theoretical concept.
Without conceptualizing Society theoretically, liberal philosophy leaves us
with empirical expositions that make theoretical assumptions about the mean-
ing of Society.
Raymond Williams traces the history of the word from meaning "companionship"
in the fourteenth century to greater levels of abstractions to mean "associations"
and "groups" by the seventeenth century.16 The conflicts of the seventeenth
century introduced a distinction between Society and state, "... the former an
association of free men, drawing on all the early active senses; the latter an
organization of power, drawing on all the senses of hierarchy and majesty."17
Thus, there was a divergence between companionship and associations or
organizations. By the eighteenth century the transition was decisive. Society was
that to which we all belong-a system of social life-and the state was the
apparatus of power. By the nineteenth century, Society became an object related
to 'man' and the 'individual' but was not the same thing. This paved the way for
social systems and the study of 'the social.' The meaning of Society changed with
the transformations in capitalism in a European context. The Enlightenment, as a
broad intellectual movement, was instrumental in reconceptualizing the meaning
of Society in the wake of capitalism and Modernity.18
The Enlightenment as an intellectual movement grew in response to European
feudalism and responded to the problems of European societies by drawing its
conceptual and intellectual resources from the Greco-Roman-Christian traditions
within which it remains rooted. 9 My point is not to contrast this response with
the Enlightenment's response to colonialism; doing so would lead to the familiar
West versus Rest dichotomy and to charges of Eurocentrism, with emotive and
ethical overtones that lead to an intellectual cul-de-sac. Rather, the purpose of
recalling the social and intellectual context for the Enlightenment is to examine
the ramifications of projecting assumptions about the meaning of Society that has
evolved within one historical context to societies within which the meaning of
Society remains to be defined and understood historically.
15. "Realism and social science" in Margaret Archer et al, eds, Critical Realism: Essential Readings
(London: Routledge, 1998) 282.
16. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana Press, 1988).
17. Ibid at 293.
18. Ibid.
19. See Uberoi, supra note 6.
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A key proposition advanced here is that First and Third World societies are
constituted through related but distinct processes: the first internal to the social
context of capitalism's development, the second its external expansionist processes
of imperialism and colonialism. These two processes, one centripetal and the
other centrifugal, constitute two different types of societies with distinct features
and properties that we recognize as First and Third Worlds. The basis for this
differentiation remains under-theorized, however. Consequently, the Third
World defined in antithetical terms to the First World as its "other" continues
to haunt social theory The ramifications of extending legal concepts and analytical
categories developed through capitalism's centripetal or internal processes to
societies constituted through its external or expansionist processes understood as
colonialism and imperialism must inform TWSLS if we wish to address the fault
line on which it is founded.
According to Karl Polanyi, for the first time in human history, capitalism
dis-embeds from Society certain aspects of life associated with material provisions
that it characterizes as economic aspects.2" It is not necessary to explore this argument
for the purposes of this article except to reiterate Polanyi's point that the social
transformation brought about by trade and commodification of land and labour was
made possible by a philosophy that reduced collective social life-or companionship
of the fourteenth century-to relations between individuals, on the one hand,
and a relationship with nature through property relations on the other.21 Equally,
what is dis-embedded from Society is re-embedded in institutions of states and
markets created through the fiat of law.22 The scope and processes of embedding,
dis-embedding, and re-embedding economic aspects of social life in capitalist
and colonial societies produced two distinct types of societies with distinct
attributes and properties. These processes have dramatically contrasting implications
for the functionality or dysfunctionality of law and institutions in the two types
of societies.
However, the obfuscation of the concept of Society in theory was a necessary
condition for social transformations to occur in both types of societies.
Methodologically, the obfuscation of Society as a theoretical category was achieved
20. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1957).
21. For the difference between legal relationships with individuals and with nature under
liberalism and within traditionally pluralist pre-colonial Indian society, see Radha D'Souza,
Interstate Disputes over Krishna Waters: Law, Science and Imperialism (New Delhi: Orient
Longman, 2006) at ch 3 [D'Souza, Krishna Waters].
22. Radha D'Souza, "The 'Rights' Conundrum: Poverty of Philosophy Amidst Poverty" in Reza
Banakar, ed, Rights in Context: Law andJustice in Late Modern Society (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010) 55.
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in philosophical liberalism through three moves: (a) a privileging of epistemology
over ontology; (b) philosophical dualism including the nature versus society and
society versus ethics and aesthetics divisions in social theory; and (c) engagement
with the problem of 'Universals' as the binary 'Other' of the 'Particular' in
philosophy. It is to these moves that we need to turn our attention in social theory
if we are to transcend the problem of binary categories and dualist methods
entailed in the West versus Rest polarity that confounds TWSLS.
'The institution of the state complicates the concept of Society. As Outhwaite
points out, at first Society was seen as the third estate and a threat to the state;
later it came to be squeezed within a territorial or institutional state.23 According
to Outhwaite, when we speak of Society, we enter into a language game that
licenses certain types of theoretical moves and not others, and that introduces an
element of abstraction.4 Following Outhwaite, we cannot do without a concept
of Society because the alternative is to have an ontology of the individual.25 As
human actions presuppose social networks and social preconditions, some
conception of the collective life becomes necessary. Liberalism straddles this
question by squeezing society into the state, on the one hand, and reducing it to
atomized individuals standing in contractual relations with the state on the other
hand. This is the "civil society" of classical liberal theory.26 The concept of civil
society is not to be conflated with Society, however. Civil society under capitalism
refers to those institutions in the private sphere that underpin the economy.
Society is much more.
The increase in the number of sociological and historical accounts of law in
Third World societies does not do away with the need to answer the question,
"What is Society?" Without answering this question, it is impossible to speak of
the First and Third World without becoming mired in contradictions. In the
absence of a theoretical understanding of Society, social theory is left with
descriptions of societies. Descriptions alone do not provide the cues to make the
causal connections between diverse events or facts, nor to identify trajectories of
change. Sociological accounts describe social structures and the constraints that
the structures impose on human life but tend to be deterministic because the
descriptions of structural constraints are less able to integrate ethical and aesthetic
23. Supra note 15.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid
26. For the meaning of 'civil society' see Radha D'Souza, "Looking into the Crystal Ball: 'Civil
Society' and 'Humanity' in the 21st Century' (2007) 18 Polylog: J Intercultural Philosophy
55 [D'Souza, "Crystal Ball"].
420 (2012] 49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
dimensions of social life. Descriptions of ethics and aesthetics emphasise agency
and subjectivity but tend to be voluntaristic as they are less able to integrate
structural constraints for social changes. For example, empirical accounts show
real differences between the realities in First and Third World societies. These
differences are echoed in everyday language. For example, newspapers and Western
politicians routinely use expressions like 'Third World conditions' to describe
deteriorating public services in the First World. Sociological accounts of First and
Third World realities show the geo-historical mechanisms that structure the two
worlds in very different ways even when they remain mutually constitutive and
interdependent. Discourses in ethics and aesthetics reveal the desire for justice,
freedom, and humanity, and emphasize the solidarity and unity of both worlds.
When the concept of Society is foregrounded in the understanding that
Nature, Society, and Human Life are ontologically distinct but nevertheless
related, it becomes possible to produce an epistemology that simultaneously
accounts for differences between societies and sustains human impulses for
solidarity and freedom. It becomes possible to argue that First and Third Worlds
are specific conjunctures of Nature-Society-Human Life constituted through
the geo-historical processes of capitalism and imperialism in different ways.
Capitalism and imperialism reconstitute First and Third Worlds in definite ways
and imbue the two societies with different characteristics and properties that
are experienced as difference in everyday life. The freedoms and constraints of
the two types of societies are experienced differently by people living in those
societies. The source of solidarity therefore, does not flow from eliminating difference
discursively in ethics or analytically in social theory. Rather, it flows from the
understanding that the desire for freedom is an ontological attribute of being
human that must be respected universally. The ways in which human freedoms
are curtailed are different for different types of societies. The differences are often cast
in adversarial structural relations with other societies. This way of understanding unity
and difference distinguishes between the desire for freedom in all people and the
different modes of articulation of that desire in politics, which is prompted by
the specificities of social formations in a given geo-historical moment. Bringing
ontology to the centre stage of theory helps us to anchor the idea of Third World
Society in theory, by whatever name it is called, without subsuming the differences
between the societies, nor undermining the possibility of theory. It becomes
possible to argue for solidarity without fetishizing the adversarial structural
relations that the coupling of capitalism and imperialism creates between First
and Third World societies or minimizing the imperatives of structural constraints.
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An understanding of Society at the ontological level invites us to epistemological
inquiries that are ontologically aware, structurally astute, and empirically sensitive.
Differences at the structural level do not negate human solidarities. Differences,
while recognizing antagonistic interests of groups and societies, can take into
account the different types of freedoms that each group or society seeks. They
open up the possibilities of directionally different but ontologically consistent
political programs for action. If A and B are standing in opposition but wish to
reach midpoint-or another destination for that matter-they must travel in
different, opposed directions to achieve the same objective. This possibility is
foreclosed by liberal philosophy where sameness is contrasted with difference.
The reduced emphasis on ontology in liberal philosophy precludes unity at the
higher ontological level.
One category that produces endless conundrums in social theory is the
Universals. In the Greco-Roman-Christian intellectual traditions, the Universal
as a category in philosophy stands in opposition to the Particular. This way of
framing the Universal as the opposite of the Particular in philosophy has produced
binary concepts and dualistic methods wherein social theory must either abstract
substance from form, as modernist theories do, or privilege the Particular over the
abstractions, as postmodernism does." This is not the only way of understanding
27. Universalism and methods of abstraction in Western social theory and its critique by
postmodern thinkers are deeply entrenched in social theory. Naturally there are a range
of theoretical approaches to universalism and abstraction in modernist theories. Equally
there is a range of critique of universalism from postmodernist perspectives and critiques of
postmodern devaluation of theory from modernist perspectives. For modernist approaches
to abstractions, see Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science: A realist approach (London:
Routledge, 1992) at ch 3; for differences in Marxist and Critical Realist methods, see JM
Roberts, "Marxism and Critical Realism: The Same, Similar, or Just Plain Different?"
(1999) 68 Capital & Class 21; for a postmodern critique of meta-theories, see Jean-Franqois
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1984); for Marxist critiques of postmodern approaches to meta-theories, see
David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change
(Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990). For a broader sociological account of modernism and
postmodernism, see Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations ofPostmodernity (London: Routledge,
1992); see also Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and its Discontents (New York: New York
University Press, 1997). For a critique of universalism in law from postmodern perspectives,
see Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001); for Third World perspectives on postmodernism, see Ziauddin Sardar,
Postmodernism and the Other. The New Imperialism of Western Culture (London: Pluto Press,
1998). For general overviews of modernist and postmodernist approaches, see Lawrence
Cahoone, ed, From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology (Malden: Blackwell, 2003);
Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham & Mo Malek, eds, Postmodernism and the Social Sciences
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992).
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Universals, however. In other philosophical traditions, Universals do not stand
in opposition to Particulars as in the Greco-Roman-Christian traditions. Raja
Ram Dravid, for example, argues that in the Indian traditions Universals are seen
as distinct types of properties not necessarily opposed to Particulars.28 A move
in social theory to reconceptualize categories like Universals and Particulars,
drawing from philosophical traditions different from the Greco-Roman-Judeo-
Christian traditions, has the potential to provide a way out of the current impasse
in theory produced by methodological dualism and binary concepts. It opens
up possibilities of grounding concepts and theories in the materiality of the
contemporary world and at the same time opens up pathways to reconceptualize
freedom and emancipation for all.
Following these observations on the need to problematize Society in TWSLS,
the question emerges, "What are the attributes and properties of societies
constituted through the processes of colonialism and imperialism, and what
is the role of law in the production of those attributes and properties that
we recognize as the Third World?" 'The next three Parts follow this thread by
examining three sets of binary frameworks used in TWSLS: first, comparative
law versus TWAIL; second, economic versus cultural spheres in law; and third,
legal centralism versus pluralism.
II. WHAT IS 'ASIAN' ABOUT LAW IN ASIA?
It may be useful to begin the discussion of comparative law versus TWAIL at
the empirical level by considering widely accepted, everyday practices in the
academic community on legal issues in the Third World context. In 2003,
thirteen law schools in Asia formed the Asian Law Institute (ASLI) under the
aegis of the National University of Singapore. ASLI held its inaugural conference
in May 2004 in Singapore on the theme of "Law in Asia." Of the twenty-two
panels on different sub-themes of law in Asia, only one panel, entitled "On
Asian-ness: Traditions, Identity and Impact on Asia and Asians," was explicitly
about Asian-ness.29 Papers presented on the panel addressed interpretations of
28. The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972).
29. Ihe theme of the Asian Law Institute's May 2012 conference is 'Asian Identity?" Ihe
question mark appears to suggest that the idea of Asian-ness' may be open to interrogation
at the conference. In this connection, the theme is reminiscent of the debates in the
1990s in social sciences on Asian values' that were driven largely by the success of the
economies of some countries in the Asian region. See e.g. Fred Dalmayr, "Asian Values'
and Global Human Rights" (2002) 52 Philosophy East and West 173; Michael C Davis,
"Constitutionalism and Political Culture: Ihe Debate Over Human Rights and Asian Values"
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Shar'ia in the region, Buddhist and Christian perspectives on law, and law in
the Tang dynasty in China. All other panels were about applying international
law, public and private, and principles of modern law to various fields in the
economy-and, related to it, human rights, labour, and environment standards
in Asian states. Law in Asia was about extending the developments in international
law and dominant capitalist states to Asia and, at best, being vigilant about how
the extensions might affect the state and economy in the region. So one might
ask what is Asian' about Law in Asia?
ASLI went on to publish a journal entitled Asian Journal of Comparative Law.
There are several other Asian law journals." Like the panels at the ASH conferences,
a sweeping overview of the subjects addressed in the Asian law journals reflect a
similar pattern, where modern law addresses problems in economics and related
fields like labour, environment, and human rights; traditional law-often
religious law-addresses cultural issues concerning family and inheritance; and
land tenure falls somewhere in between. This architecture of law in Asia-where
the jurisdiction of modern law prevails over economic spheres and the jurisdiction
of traditional law prevails over cultural spheres outside the economy-is common
to most Third World countries. It also mirrors the wider society it services where,
generally speaking, the cultural sphere is governed by traditional law and the
economic sphere is governed by modern law.
Comparative law provides the analytical framework for dominant approaches to
law in Asia as evidenced at the conference, or for that matter, dominant TWSLS.
Comparative law is methodologically weak. As Burkhard Schafer points out,
comparative law starts with an assumption of comparability and some form of
functionalism, in that it assumes some correlation between legal forms and social
functions and draws on legal history to establish the correlation.31 Comparative
law and legal historiography in dominant scholarship, thus, share common
presuppositions-both are premised on the rationality of legal responses to
societal demands.32 For legal systems to be compatible, writes Schafer, it is
(1998) 11 Harv Hum RtsJ 109; Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Asian Values" (Sixteenth
Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy, delivered at the Carnegie
Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 25 May 1997); Mark R Thompson, "Whatever
Happened To 'Asian Values'? " (2001) 12 J of Democracy 154.
30. See e.g. Asian Journal of International Law; Asian Law Journal; The Australian Journal of
Asian Law; East Asia Law Review; Asian American Law Journal; Columbia Journal of Asian
Law; and Asian Journal of International Law.
31. "Form Follows Function Fails - as a Sociological Foundation of Comparative Law" (1999)
13 Social Epistemology 113.
32. Ibid at 126.
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sufficient they have a shared core: "That is, we either have to identify a historical
core programme (legal history), or extrapolate one logically (comparative law)."33
Schafer draws from comparative legal scholarship on common law and
continental civil law to explain how the core of Roman law provides the basis for
explanations of the divergent "development of legal systems that share historical
roots."34 These attempts to strengthen the epistemological foundations of comparative
law work where shared historical, cultural, and philosophical traditions provide
a repertoire of conceptual resources for the development and communication of
ideas between the societies within which the legal systems operate. This is seen
in common law and continental civil law systems underpinned by a core that
is derived from Roman law. The absence of an intersubjective order makes a
shared core for comparative law for legal systems in Third World and First World
societies methodologically problematic. Is comparative law possible where the
legal histories do not provide a shared core? 5 More importantly, in the case of
Asia and other Third World societies where comparative law dominates
the economic sphere, the pressing question is this: "Is it possible at all to cast
economic and social spheres into legal systems with radically different normative,
ethical, institutional, and conceptual 'grundnorms"'?36
We shall return to this architecture of law again in the next section.
Suffice it to note here that such a problem does not exist in the Euro-American
capitalist societies. 7 While Euro-American law in every sphere has transformed
and evolved over time, it remains grounded in, and inspired by, various strands
of Greco-Roman-Christian intellectual, cultural, and legal traditions. Dissent,
change, and evolution all refer back to, and continue to draw on, the conceptual and
philosophical resources from those traditions. Indeed, modern law is a product of
those traditions. In Third World societies, the gap between culture and economy
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. This raises a related question for Asian-ness': Is comparative law an adequate framework for Asian
countries that arguably share intersubjective social features and shared experiences of colonialism?
36. Used here in Kelsen's sense of positing a basic set of grounds from which all other legal norms
may be derived. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1967) at 8-9.
37. First Nations in North American settler capitalist societies historically and structurally share
common features with Third World societies, even if they exist within capitalist states. For
distinctions between colonial and capitalist states see Radha D'Souza, "The 'Third World'
and Socio-Legal Studies: Neo-Liberalism and Lessons from India's Legal Innovations" (2005)
14 Soc & Leg Stud 487 [D'Souza, "Socio-Legal Studies"].
38. See Geoffrey Samuel, "Roman Law and Modern Capitalism" (1984) 4 LS 185; Michael E
Tigar & Madeleine R Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review
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manifests in law as two distinct domains of law. This gap in law-between the
historical past where the roots of culture lie and the geographical present where
global economic relations play out between states, on the one hand, and its
manifestation as a rupture in the intellectual moorings of its economy and
culture, on the other hand-is under-theorized in TWSLS. What John ComarofP 9
asks about studies on colonialism and law may be asked about TWSLS more
generally. Summarizing the trajectory that seems to have brought studies of law
and colonialism to a resting point, Comaroff argues that there is a convergence
and consensus on colonial law as being both an instrument of domination and a
site of resistance. He asks, "Is there anything more to say on the topic, other than
to offer further historical and/or ethnographic illustration?"40 Although Comaroff
answers the question in the affirmative, what is proposed by way of a future agenda
for law and colonialism studies is to develop a more nuanced understanding
of complexities of the role of law in colonization by undertaking empirically
grounded and methodologically improved accounts of law in colonialism.
Such approaches could certainly produce better socio-legal studies of the Third
World. Whether it will shift the grounds of philosophy of law or social theory
is a pressing question. In any event, philosophical questions about law in society
cannot be deduced from sociological accounts of law. Nor is it possible to arrive
at a theory of Society from sociological accounts. Sociological accounts presuppose
concepts and analytical frameworks grounded in social philosophy.
In contrast to comparative law approaches in dominant Asian and other
regional legal studies, TWAIL claims to be a movement within international law
that seeks to study international law from Third World perspectives. Although
TWAIL scholars defend the use of the term Third World, there is considerable
ambiguity in what is meant by the term and the conceptual basis for its use. For
Obiora Okafor, Third World is a contingent but useful category that is self-
referential.41 Third World therefore becomes a question of identity. For Makau
Mutua the term Third World is "a stream of similar historical experiences across
virtually all non-European societies that has given rise to a particular voice, a
form of intellectual and political consciousness [and] captures the oppositional
dialectic between the European and the non-European." 42 The TWAIL conference
Press, 1977); Franz Wieacker, "The Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization and
Western Legal Thought" (1981) 4 BC Int'l & Comp L Rev 257.
39. "Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword" (2001) 26 Law & Soc Inquiry 305.
40. Ibid at 307.
41. Supra note 7.
42. "What is TWAIL?" in Paul B Stephan III, Proceedings of the Ninety-fourth AnnualMeeting
of the American Society of International Law, Washington DC, 2000 (Washington: American
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held at Albany Law School in April 2007 defined Third World as "a contingent
and shifting space of engagement and interaction of differences that are irreconcilable
sometimes, and overlapping and reinforcing in others." a4
The object of knowledge for TWAIL scholars is international law, not the
Third World. TWAIL scholars aim to provide a perspective on international law
from the vantage point of marginalized nations. TWAIL approaches deconstruct and
contextualize the ways in which international law is formed through the encounter
of European powers with colonized societies. 4 Reversing the perspective
from European to non-European does not, however, change the conceptual
frames that inform international law, nor does it reveal what is entailed in
projecting those concepts onto Third World realities. TWAIL approaches embed
the Other in epistemology, even when challenging it empirically, and remain
constrained by the West versus Rest dichotomy.
In their normative standards, TWAIL scholars remain modernist inasmuch
as they seek ethical interventions to reform international law so that it lives up
to its normative claims of equality and non-discrimination. It is beside the point
whether such approaches are offshoots of Northern scholarship or not.45 What is
important is whether the scholarship falls back on moral or ethical transformation
and voluntarism to ground ideas of freedom and equality between all societies
and whether or not it opens pathways for transformation where freedom and
equality between societies qua societies are grounded in the materiality of a world
based on relations of super- and subordination.
Andrew Sunter argues that TWAIL approaches may be described as
naturalized epistemological inquiries." As such, they rely on a posterior empirical
knowledge to arrive at a priori claims. TWAIL approaches, therefore, fall back
on philosophical empiricism in the form of past experiences of the Third World
to critique international law. These approaches reify the status quo by grounding the
possibility of transcendence in past experiences. While this critique and deconstruction
make an important contribution to our understanding of the role of international
law in sustaining inequalities between societies in the past and present, deconstruction
Society of International Law, 2000) 31 [Mutua, "What is TWAIL?"].
43. See Albany Law School, "The Third World and International Law Conference TWAIL III"
(20 April 2007), online: Australian National University <http://cigj.anu.edu.au/cigj/link-
documents/Events/assocevents/TWAILBrochure.pdf>.
44. See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
45. C.f Antony Anghie & BS Chimni, "Third World Approaches to International Law and
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts" (2003) 2 Chinese J Int'l L 77.
46. "TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry" (2007) 20 Can JL & Jur 475.
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alone does not suffice for transcendence of the West versus Rest polarity. Nor
does it help to redefine the meaning of freedom. We remain in what Teemu
Ruskola calls the "hermeneutical loop." 7 We do not have a way of answering the
question, What is 'Asian' about Asian law? Fear of essentialism and reductionism,
on the one hand, and universalism and meta-theories without social content, on
the other hand, prevents escape from hermeneutical loops.
Some scholars have argued that there is a spatial tension in the theory-
practice dialectic of knowledge production in that theory production remains
located in the First World but is based on experiences produced in the Third
World.48 While locations and spatial dialectics of knowledge production are important,
we must be careful not to over-determine the case for location to the detriment
of intellectual creativity and human solidarities. Rather, the problems may lie
in philosophical dualism, which dominates Modernist and Enlightenment thinking.
Philosophical dualism produces conceptual deadlocks by locking binary
categories into oppositional positions and thereby forestalling transcendence and
emergence. As Roy Bhaskar shows in his work Dialectics: Pulse of Freedom,
thesis and antithesis share common grounds.49 The hermeneutical cycles create
and recreate familiar patterns in the analytical frameworks that inform knowledge of
the Third World and continue to reproduce unequal relations even after several
centuries of resistances and solidarities to end them. The result is pessimism
and obeisance to what is described metaphorically as the "empire of law."50
In the light of these observations about TWSLS, how may we understand
the dichotomy, exemplified by the ASLI conference, between modern or
economic domains, on one hand, and traditional or cultural domains, on
the other? The next Part explores this question by interrogating the public/
private divide in law.
III. TRADITIONAL IN CULTURE AND MODERN IN ECONOMY?
The opposing directionality of capitalism and imperialism in the constitution of
societies in the First and Third Worlds produces asymmetries in the substance
and form of concepts used to analyze modern societies. In other words, the
47. "Legal Orientalism" (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 179 at 232.
48. See e.g. Saraswati Raju, "Production of Knowledge: Looking for 'Theory' in 'Familiar'
Places?" (2006) 37 Geoforum 155.
49. (London: Verso, 1993).
50. C.f Mark Goodale, "Empires of Law: Discipline and Resistance within the Transnational
System" (2005) 14 Soc & Leg Stud 553.
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geo-historical content of concepts in social theory is not comparable even when
comparable vocabulary is used. This is more significant in law because legal
concepts define social relations and reify their normativity. Law-in particular
the foundations of positive law-rests on definitions. In order to understand
the economic-modern versus cultural-traditional architecture of law in the Third
World, it becomes necessary to problematize the language of law by interrogating
core legal categories in light of insights provided by historical and sociological
critique. It is necessary to go beyond comparing and contrasting the observable
effects of law in different nation-states, as in sociological and anthropological
studies, and to begin building a philosophical foundation for TWSLS.
How the asymmetries in the substance and form of legal concepts sustain the
divide between modern law in the domain of the economy and traditional law in
the domain of culture in the legal architecture of Third World societies may be
exemplified by interrogating the use of the legal categories of "public" and "private"
in law. The public/private divide is a structural feature of modern law. Legal
theory works on the premise that law has two branches that operate in two different
social spheres. Jowitt' Dictionary ofEnglish Law defines Public Law it as follows:
[L]aw is either public or private. ... Public law is that part of the law which deals with the
State, either by itself or in its relations with individuals, and is called constitutional, when
it regulates the relations between the various divisions of the sovereign power; and
administrative, when it regulates the business which the state has to do....
To the contrary:
Private or civil law deals with those relations between individuals with which the state is not
directly concerned: as in the relations between husband and wife, parent and child, and the
various kinds of property, contracts, torts, trusts, legacies, the right recognized by the rules
of admiralty etc.
52
The two branches of law limit the role of the state and sovereign power in First
World societies. The public/private divide is not as neat in reality as it is conceptually,
nor is it uncontested. Over time, the boundaries have been contested, altered, and
realigned.53 More recently, globalization has revived debates on the public/private
51. The Late Right Honourable The Earl Jowitt & Clifford Walsh, Jowitts Dictionary of English
Law, 2d ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1977) sub verbo "Law" at 1069.
52. Ibid.
53. For debates and discussions on the public/private divide, see 130 U Pa L Rev (1982). See
also Dawn Oliver, Common Values and the Public/private Divide (London, UK: Butterworths,
1999); Michael Taggart, "The Nature and Functions of the State" in Peter Cane & Mark
Tushnet, eds, The Oxjord Handbook of Legal Studies (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003) 101; Margaret Thornton, ed, Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Melbourne:
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divide just as the debate revived after the end of World War II in the context
of rebuilding economies and society and the "welfare states" in capitalist societies.54
Nevertheless, the two spheres of law continue to define the role of the state in
society and to provide a point of reference for the architecture of law. What is
important for our purposes is that in the history of the First World, normatively and
conceptually, economy and culture simultaneously formed part of the private spheres
of law and defined the boundaries of the state. Land, trade, and property rights--
alongside marriage, inheritance, adoption, and such-were part of the private spheres
where the state's role needed to be policed against incursions. When statutes trespassed
into the private spheres, they required special justifications. Classical liberal theory
devoted considerable energy to keeping the state at arm's length from the economy and
from culture. Equally important is that in policing the boundaries, the public/private
divide continued to rely on the extended history of the concept in Roman law.s5 Indeed
the public/private concepts and divisions developed through contested histories in Europe
and contributed to the development of capitalism and imperialism during all its
phases.56 It is not surprising that the public/private divide became the focus of debate in
the globalization phase of capitalism and imperialism."
In contrast, colonial law extended the conceptual categories of public/private
spheres to colonial societies, but infused them with different socio-economic
content. Colonial rule gathered a diverse range of castes, communities, tribes,
and nationalities under the umbrella of the colonial state. Economic matters such
as contracts, easements, trade, forests, fisheries, minerals, and land-traditionally
within the private sphere in Europe under Roman law traditions-were brought
under state regulation through public law statutes. Even contracts, the sacred cow
Oxford University Press, 1995).
54. For debates on the public/private divide in the wake of globalization, see Carl Emery, "Public
Law or Private Law?: The Limits of Procedural Reform' [1995] PL 450; Sandra Fredman &
Gillian S Morris, "The Costs of Exclusivity: Public and Private Re-examined" [1994] PL 69;
Mark Freedland, "Government by Contract and Public Law" [1994] PL 86; Geoff Pearson
& Michael Salter, "Getting Public Law Back into a Critical Condition: The Rule of Law as a
Source for Immanent Critique" (1999) 8 Soc & Leg Stud 483.
55. For the role of Roman law in Western civilization, see Franz Wieacker, "The Importance
of Roman Law for Western Civilization and Western Legal Thought" (1981) 4 BC Int'l &
Comp L Rev 257; for the place of Roman law in modern capitalism, see Geoffrey Samuel,
"Roman Law and Modern Capitalism' (1984) 4 LS 185; for the role of European law in the
development of capitalism, see Michael E Tigar & Madeleine R Levy, Law and the Rise of
Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).
56. Ibid.
57. Anghie & Chimni, supra note 45.
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of private law, were legislated into existence through public law in the colonies.58
Colonial law introduced a field of law called "personal law" or "tribal law." Matters
concerning family, inheritance, succession, marriage, divorce, and adoption were
left to be governed by the religious and tribal norms of diverse communities.
Personal/tribal law shrunk the private sphere in the colonies and expanded the
public sphere by subsuming the economy within the public sphere.5 9 Although
the concepts of public and private law are routinely used as foundational legal
categories everywhere, they denote different socio-economic and geo-historical
realities and social spheres in the Third World. In the First World, the public/private
divide limited the role of the state and defined sovereign powers. In the Third
World, it expanded the role of the state and shrank the private sphere. Retaining
the legal language of the public/private divide fetishized the assumption of sovereignty
over resources and populations that were traditionally in the private sphere in
the European legal tradition. More significantly, it enabled the colonial state to
incorporate diverse communities into the political economy of colonialism under
the umbrella of the modern colonial state. The modern state structure in the
Third World has continuities with the colonial state. The economic-modern versus
cultural-traditional law divide, in retrospect, was foundational for indirect rule,
which subsequently became the dominant mode of imperial governance globally.
Arguably, it was that architecture of law that made formal decolonization possible
under the United Nations System at the end of World War II.
The theoretical assumptions underlying personal and tribal law are important.
The assumption is that culture can somehow continue to be practiced without its
moorings in the materiality of the economy. Conversely, there is the assumption
that somehow the economy will transform and modernize social relations. Both
these assumptions are mired in contradictions. Inasmuch as all cultures must be
grounded in the materiality of societies, the assumption that cultural practices can
be continued even after the political economy has changed is fundamentally flawed.
Sir Henry Maine argued that colonial societies would progress from status-based
to contract-based relations in the same way as had happened under European
capitalism." This social Darwinism in legal theory was at odds with the colonial
58. See e.g. Stuart Banner, "Conquest by Contract: Wealth Transfer and Land Market Structure
in Colonial New Zealand" (2000) 34 Law & Soc'y Rev 47; DA Washbrook, "Law, State and
Agrarian Society in Colonial India" (1981) 15 Mod Asian Stud 649.
59. For the politics of tribal and state law in colonial South Africa, see Mahmood Mamdani,
Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996).
60. Ancient Law: Its Connections with the Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1881).
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imperative of imperial governance that necessitated incorporation of local family
and tribal structures within the wider colonial state.61 Consequently, contractual
relations in the economy did not evolve into general contract forms of social
relations in all spheres of social life.62 The processes that extended public/private
concepts in law to different socio-historical realities of the Third World created a
structural schism within Third World societies, where two sets of values, norms,
institutions, and laws-one for the economy, another for culture-regulate two
aspects of society as if the two were unrelated.
The structural schism between economy and culture is a characteristic of
Third World societies, an attribute acquired through the socio-economic and
geo-historical experiences of colonialism. This attribute assumes diverse
manifestations depending on local histories, politics, and other specificities. The
schism has a profound influence on institutions in Third World societies.
Economic institutions continue to be driven by impulses for harmonization from
dominant capitalist economies, and social institutions continue to be driven by
the impulses of nationalism and culture. The schism in the legal architecture
of the Third World sustains the swings between what Clifford Geertz calls
"epochalism" (impelled by economic modernization) and "essentialism"
(impelled by cultural nationalism) that is so typical of Third World nationalism.63
The schism produces traumatic internal upheavals. Can Iran remain a player in
the world oil markets, emerge as a nuclear power, and at the same time adhere to
pristine Islamic traditions under the same constitution? How does one fulfill the
obligation to care for one's unemployed family members in an extended family
when the labour market is based on the sale of individual labour power? If Hindu
61. See e.g. ibid.
62. The absence of contract as the general form of social relations in all spheres of social life
in the Third World, as it is in the First World, enables the World Bank to insist on law
reforms that commit to contracts and private property as a condition for continued financial
assistance. See e.g. Lawrence Tshuma, "The Political Economy of the World Bank's Legal
Framework for Economic Development" (1999) 8 Soc & Leg Stud 75; Fidler, supra note 3.
As Third World economists have pointed out, the full development of contractual relations
was impossible in the conditions of 'underdevelopment' that characterized the Third World.
See e.g. Hamza Alavi, Capitalism and Colonial Production (Kent: Croom Helm, 1982);
Hamza Alavi, "India and the Colonial Mode of Production" (1975) 10:33-35 Economic and
Political Weekly 1235; Amiya Kumar Bagchi, "Colonialism in Classical Political Economy:
Analysis, Epistemological Broadening and Mystification" (1996) 12 Stud Hist 105; Amiya
Kumar Bagchi, "Foreign Capital and Economic Development in India: A Schematic View"
in Kathleen Gough & Har P Sharma, eds, Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1973) 43.
63. 7he Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London, UK: Fontana Press, 1993).
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widows must work because the labour market does not recognize family labour, can
the moral authority of Hindu traditions alone stop her from remarrying? And how
do tribes maintain tribal authorities and traditional structures of governance when
the economy has slipped away from the tribal society?
The individual as an atomized, irreducible legal category, standing in contractual
relations with the state, created the conditions for citizenship in the First World
in the wake of capitalism. In the Third World, by contrast, ethnic, religious, and
linguistic communities were co-opted into markets and assigned places within market
institutions. Amy Chua shows how, in the Third World, the nationalization and
privatization programs prompted by the international economy impact specific
communities in definite ways, depending on their positions in the economy."1 In
the Third World, the impacts of international economic policies emanating from
the centres of capital are experienced as ethnic and racial tensions differently by
different communities.65 For example, in the context of Malaysian colonial
history, because of the respective locations of Tamils, Malays, and Chinese in the
economy and market institutions as communities, a policy that adversely affects
the rubber industry will affect Tamils, agricultural policies will affect Malays, and
trade policies will affect the Chinese. Widespread, divisive ethnic conflicts in the
Third World may have to do with a legal architecture where cultural aspirations
are cut adrift from political economy and where citizenship itself remains
collective rather than individual.
We are witness to the political economy of globalization, which is followed
by cultural conflicts.66 Contrary to the expectations of global solidarity movements
that campaigned for the rights of people in the wake of globalization, in Thailand,
people embraced religion and karma in preference to rights against the state; and
contrary to expectations, neoliberalism had the effect of expanding the scope of
shar'ia in Aceh, a region with long traditions of legal pluralism going back to
pre-colonial times.67 This 'choice,' if it may be called that, ought not to surprise
64. Amy L Chua, "The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link between Markets and
Ethnicity in Developing Countries" (1995) 95 Colum L Rev 223.
65. For an analysis in the context of Rwanda, see Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become
Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001).
66. For the linkages, see Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds
Ethnic Hatred and GlobalInstability (New York: Doubleday, 2003).
67. See David M Engel, "Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts,
and Karma in Thailand" (2005) 30 Law & Soc Inquiry 469; Arskal Salim, "Dynamic Legal
Pluralism in Indonesia: The Shift in Plural Legal Orders of Contemporary Aceh" (Max
Planck Institute For Social Anthropology, Working Paper No 110, 2009), online: <http://
www.eth.mpg.de/cms/en/publications/working-papers/>.
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us if we bear in mind the constitution of public and private spheres. Constituted
with reference to economic interests rather than citizenships, it is unsurprising
that everywhere in the Third World, economic development after independence
remained state-centred. It is hardly surprising that international organizations
like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade
Organization were able to restructure Third World states everywhere through
contractual agreements with states on lending policies in Structural Adjustment
Programs.1
8
The unproblematic use of the language of rights by protest movements-as
if it refers to the same type of citizen-state relationship as in the First World-has
the effect of reifying and embedding unequal relations between societies, even
when the intention is to the contrary. 9 Using the same vocabulary to analyze
different social realities has the effect of reifying unequal relations between First
and Third Worlds. The language of public/private in law obscures the social
realities in the Third World. The use of a common vocabulary suggests comparable
meanings and substance.0 The field of comparative law helps to point out
similarities and dissimilarities at the descriptive and definitional levels, but it does
not do the same with respect to the geo-historical causal processes that produce
radically different effects of law in different societies. Critical theories reverse the
vantage point from similarities to dissimilarities but remain methodologically within
dualist frameworks working with binary categories.1 The structural schism also
means that the tensions in Society, because of the structural disjuncture between
economy and culture, remain unresolved. This irresolution is another attribute
of Third World societies, in which law, imperial agendas and global solidarities,
contribute in turn to reproducing the schism in these societies.
The co-existence of multiple legal systems in the cultural sphere and in
the informal economy is commonly analyzed through the framework of legal
pluralism. Legal pluralism, as an analytical framework, draws on law in Third
World societies to a large extent because of the apparent co-existence of different
68. For an account of international organizations as lawmakers, see Jos6 E Alvarez, International
Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
69. See Radha D'Souza, "Law and 'Development' Discourses About Water: Understanding
Agency in Regime Changes" in P Cullet et al, eds, Water Governance in Motion: Towards
Socially and Environmentally Sustainable Water Laws (Delhi: Cambridge University Press,
2010) 477 [D'Souza, Water Governance]; Radha D'Souza, "Liberal Iheory, Human Rights
and Water-Justice: Back to Square One?" (2008) 11 Law Soc Just & Glob Dev J.
70. For similar arguments on the distinctions between 'civil society' and 'humanity' in social
theory, see D'Souza, "Crystal Ball," supra note 26.
71. Ibid. See also Part 11, above, onTWAIL.
434 (2012] 49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
normative orders that characterize Third World societies more than others. Given
the influence and popularity of legal pluralism as an analytical framework for law
in Third World societies, it is this concept that we must turn to next in order to
expand upon the economic-modern versus cultural-traditional architecture of
law in Third World societies.
IV. LEGAL PLURALISM, CENTRALISM, AND THIRD WORLD
SOCIETIES
Beginning with attempts to theorize the meaning of law in the writings of
Eugen Ehrlich, Bronislaw Malinowski and others," more recent expositions
see legal pluralism variously as co-presence of diverse legal systems in society;73
as processual;74 as postmodern, inspired by polycentricity; as autopoiesis;76 as
praxiological; 77 and as anti-hegemonic.18 This brief snapshot does not attempt to
capture the nuances and orientations of the diversity in the approaches to legal
pluralism.79 The purpose of the snapshot is to make the point that the idea of legal
pluralism is an enduring one with an extended genealogy in socio-legal studies;
that it uses analytical, empirical, and pragmatic methods; that it is popular in
anthropological and sociological studies of law; and that the debates on legal
72. Roscoe Pound, 'An Appreciation of Eugen Ehrlich" 36 Harv L Rev 129 at 130, 145; Marc
Hertogh, ed, Living Law: Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009);
Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture, and other essays (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1944); For more recent writings on legal pluralism see
Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger & Laila al-Zwaini, LegalPluralism in theArab World
(The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Helene Maria Kyed, "The
Politics of Legal Pluralism: State Policies on Legal Pluralism and Their Local Dynamics in
Mozambique" 59 J Legal Pluralism 87; Arskal Salim, supra note 67 at 1-18; Jeremy Weber,
"Legal Pluralism and Human Agency" 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 167.
73. See e.g. John Griffiths, "What Is Legal Pluralism?" (1986) 24 J Legal Pluralism 1 [Griffiths,
"Legal Pluralism"].
74. See e.g Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An AnthropologicalApproach (Oxford: James Currey 2000).
75. See e.g. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalisation
andEmancipation (London, UK: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002).
76. See e.g. Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, translated by Anne Bankowska &
Ruth Adler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); see also Niklas Luhman, Law as a Social System,
translated by Klaus A Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
77. See e.g. Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger & Laila al-Zwain, eds, Legal Pluralism in theArab
World (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999).
78. Mutua, "What is TWAIL?" supra note 42.
79. For a summary of the different orientations to legal pluralism, see Jeremy Webber, "Legal
Pluralism and Human Agency' (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 167.
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pluralism have changed over time. While the analytical and conceptual engagement
with legal pluralism do not limit legal pluralism to Third World or colonial
societies, the empirical studies on legal pluralism are dominated by examples
of multiple legal systems under colonialism and in contemporary Third World
societies. The point here is not about legal pluralism as such, but rather about
the epistemological implications of the use of legal pluralism for analysis of Third
World societies.
At the core of legal pluralism is the idea that law cannot be limited to
state-centred law and that multiple systems of law operate in society. It is a reaction
to the privileging of state law in modern societies. The idea of legal pluralism
developed in juxtaposition to state law. Later strands in legal pluralist thought
engage the meaning of law and the state-society context within which law,
however understood, operates. The idea that state-centred law is the only legitimate
law is an idea that emerged with capitalism. John Griffiths refers to this as the
ideology of legal centralism. According to Griffiths:
An important part of the ideological heritage of the bourgeois revolutions and liberal
hegemony of the last few centuries is the complex of ideas concerning the nature
of law and its place in social life. According to what I shall call the ideology of
legal centralism, law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons,
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions. To
the extent that other, lesser normative orderings, such as the church, the family, the
voluntary association and the economic organization exist, they ought to be and in
fact are hierarchically subordinate to the law and the institution of the state.
80
From this, Griffiths goes on to develop the argument that legal pluralism
is concomitant to social pluralism. In other words, as social action always takes
place in multiple semi-autonomous fields, there are multiple fields of law
reflective of the wider social fields.81 It is worth dwelling on Griffiths' idea that
the primacy given to state law is a heritage of bourgeois revolutions. From the
geo-historical experiences of Western societies, is it possible to abstract the proposition
that legal centralism is ideology everywhere and legal pluralism the reality, as
Griffiths does?
In the geo-historical context of capitalism, legal pluralism in the First World
refers to those unrecognized, invisible, law-like relations, facilitative of the
smooth functioning of society. Legal pluralists in the First World argue that these
contributions of non-state law must be valued and recognized. Equally, since the
bourgeois revolutions that established capitalism as the social order in the West,
80. Griffiths, "Legal Pluralism," supra note 73 at 2.
81. Ibid.
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more and more aspects of social life have been commodified. Stated differently,
more and more aspects of social life are brought under legal centralism by making
them contingent on incorporated entities created by the fiat of law. Even everyday
social support activities like caring for the sick and elderly, protection from crime,
and caring for children rely on provisioning services through legally sanctioned
entities like cancer victims support groups, neighbourhood watch groups, or
childcare centres, whether voluntary or paid.
In contrast, in the Third World, it is legal pluralism that is ideological.
Legal pluralism in the Third World holds out the possibility of the co-existence
of imperialism and nationalism, a modern economy driven by the centres of
capital like the G8 nations, where nationalism comes to be defined in terms of
racial identities and cultural practices. It fetishizes the ways in which institutional
developments in the Third World reproduce relations of super- and subordination
in the economy on the one hand, and anchors the right to self-determination in
essentialized identities on the other.
It is important to bear in mind that both markets and states are complexes
of laws. As creatures of the law, they provide the institutional infrastructure for
capitalism.82 In the Third World, modern institutions (as complexes of laws)
developed largely with regard to those aspects of society that were operationally
brought under the capitalist economy through imperialism. 3 Therefore, large
swathes of economy and society continue to remain outside modern institutions.
For example, the so-called informal sectors of the economy in the Third World that
dominate the literature on poverty and development exist outside state centralism.84
When viewed through an empirical lens, the informal economy appears as diver-
sity and validates legal pluralism. However, as an analytical framework for law in
the Third World, legal pluralism sustains the wider political economy of capitalism and
imperialism in reproducing two types of labour markets-formal and informal-
where the formal labour market is tied to global political economy and the informal
to subsistence and survival. In the wider context of asymmetrical power relationships,
legal pluralism plays an ideological role in imperial governance in a number of ways.
First, legal pluralism rationalizes the politics of exclusion. The positive
connotations and values attributed to legal pluralism means that the exclusion
82. See D'Souza, Water Governance, supra note 69.
83. For how this occurred in the context of Indian constitutional history, see D'Souza, "Socio-
Legal Studies," supra note 37.
84. The recognition of a large informal economy prompted the influential work of Hernando de
Soto. See Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and
Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
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of some segments of society from modern institutions is rationalized. It obscures
the reality that co-existence is not a voluntary or desirable state of affairs. For
example, workers in the informal sector may improvise law-like norms and codes
for survival. These norms and codes exist alongside those in the formal sector,
where workers are protected by modern law. The co-existence of the two sectors
is rationalized as plural orders. The creativity of the informal sector workers is
celebrated.85 This celebration obscures the ways in which imperialism constitutes
two classes of workers-one protected by trade unions and rights of collective
bargaining and another who are excluded from legal protection and left to their
own creative strategies for survival.86 The normative idea, however, remains one
where trade unions and rights of collective bargaining are recognized by the state
and extended to all, even when large sections of the workforce must necessarily
be excluded from the normative ideal because of the structure of global labour
markets. While legal pluralism invites us to recognize the normative and regulatory
aspects of informal sectors of the economy and to celebrate the human spirit
that challenges its exclusion, it fetishizes the exclusion of large sections of the
workforce from the norms and regulations of the state and conceals the reality
that not all workers in the Third World can be protected by law. This example
85. Legal pluralism produces curious outcomes. For example, the well-known Marxist
geographer David Harvey analyzes the shift in the international divisions of labour
from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of production and concludes that "the turn to more
flexible labor processes could be seen as an opening to a new era of democratic and highly
decentralized labor relations and co-operative endeavours." See David Harvey, The Condition
ofPostmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1990) at 353. Hernando de Soto, a well-known neo-liberal advocate of privatisation and
private property rights, also recognises de facto legal pluralism but argues for including
such plurality as part of a regime of private property rights. He writes, "Outside the west,
extralegal social contracts prevail for a good reason: They have managed much better than
formal law to build on the actual consensus between people about how their assets ought to
be governed. Any attempt to create a unified property system that does not take into account
the collective contracts that underpin existing property arrangements will crash into the
very roots of the rights most people rely on for holding onto their assets." See Hernando de
Soto, The Mystery of Capitak Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else
(London: Bantam, 2000) at 171. Others have recognised that the need for survival of the
poor in the Third World produces legal pluralism but argue that it has the potential to be
used in counter-hegemonic ways. On globalization and labour policies see Adelle Blackett,
"Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of
Codes of Corporate Conduct" (2000-2001) 8 Ind J Global Legal Stud 401. Also on squatter
settlements in Brazil, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "The Law or the Oppressed: The
Construction and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada" (1977) 12 Law & Soc'y Rev 5.
86. See Radha D'Souza, "Law and Informalisation of Work In India" in Sarath Dhavala, ed, Unprotected
Labour in India: Issues and Concerns, (New Delhi: Fredrick Erbert Stiftung, 1995) at 139-68.
438 (2012) 49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
may be extended to other aspects of life in the Third World, including shelter,
food, education, and other basic necessities of life. 87
The celebration of agency in legal pluralism misjudges the cause of creativity,
in this case the resilience of informal sector workers and their capacities to create
alternative norms to survive. It is the ontological desire for freedom that drives
the creativity of the unorganized sector workers. The inability to conceptualize
this ontological drive, which is an essential attribute of being human, leads to
epistemological confusion over how to understand their creativity and resilience.
Legal pluralism's celebration of agency misdirects us from important political
questions about the commodification of labour, the modes of its institutionalization
in global labour markets, and the way in which human agency might apply its
desire for emancipation towards intentional structural transformations beyond
existence and survival in the present.
Second, legal pluralism is ideological in that the exclusion of swathes of
the economy and society from modern institutions makes state centralization
the normative ideal. Third World states must endeavour to bring more and
more aspects of the economy and society into their fold, in the same way this
happened under Western capitalism. The lending policies of international organizations
and Western governments and ideas of good governance promoted by both
are premised on the normative ideal of state law and the state's role in
introducing regulatory changes compatible with international economy.
Third, legal pluralism as an ideology provides the Third World state
with devices to govern and manage the social outcomes of appropriation
and expropriation by capitalism and imperialism. It does this by switching
between economy and culture as rationale for law-that is, by switching, in
Geertz's words, from epochalism to essentialism so as to stave off systemic crisis.88
Lastly, it fetishizes the fact that colonialism structurally transformed the Third
World and that it is not possible to have capitalist-style social transformation
there without the opportunities for colonialism, expansionism, and militarism.
Those opportunities have been foreclosed for Third World societies historically.
Legal pluralism was an essential condition for the creation of the colonial
state. It was the legal device that brought pre-existing communities tied to land
and social groups such as tribes or castes into a relationship with the colonial state
87. See e.g. de Sousa Santos, supra note 85 on squatter settlements in Brazil.
88. For a study of the use of legal pluralism in state policies and its effects on society in
Mozambique, see Helene Maria Kyed, "The Politics of Legal Pluralism: State Policies on
Legal Pluralism and Their Local Dynamics in Mozambique" (2009) 59 J Legal Pluralism 87.
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and provided them a place within the colonial political economy.9 These relation-
ships continue to characterize the Third World and inform international
relations, whether they are ethnic conflicts or economic relations. The introduc-
tion of personal law, for example, must be evaluated by taking into account
the introduction of economic laws, the creation of the colonial state, and the
discourses that rationalized the courses of action in economy and culture. Legal
pluralists, drawing on sociological and anthropological research, have argued that
the introduction of personal law in colonial societies was due to uncertainties of
colonial rule and have tended to provide explanations based on the enhanced scope for
agency of subordinate social groups.9 However, without some conception of Society
within which social relationships exist-for example, between men and women or
between upper and lower class-the categories used in sociological and anthropological
research remain dehistoricized and despatialized. Accordingly, they can either lead to
classical modernist universalism or to critical postmodern particularism. Politically,
cultural and empirical explanations for personal law produce vacillating orientations
to imperialism and colonialism by seeing them as progressive in some respects and
oppressive in others: On the one hand, ethno-centric nationalisms that arose after
formal decolonization are fetishized; on the other hand, economic subordination by
international organizations is represented as an historical inevitability.
Concepts, including sociological and anthropological categories of analysis,
are also products of social history and geography. Without a conception of Society
in philosophy and social theory, critical scholarship is caught in the hermeneutic
loop of either decrying imperialism or qualifying it by alluding to its 'liberating'
aspects, and in both cases obfuscating the wider question of the relationship
between economy and culture in social theory. The point here is not that legal
centralism is superior to legal pluralism or vice versa, or that they can be used
in hegemonic ways for imperial agendas and in counter-hegemonic ways by
global solidarity movements. Nor is it limited to showing how hegemonic and
counter-hegemonic uses share common conceptual grounds that reproduce
unequal relations between societies forged under colonialism. Rather, the purpose
is to open up pathways for transcending the economy/culture schism internally in
Third World societies, on the one hand, and the unequal relations between First
and Third World societies externally, on the other. The challenge is to find ways
89. Undoubtedly these changes opened up new possibilities for action for social groups that is
captured in the literature on legal pluralism. See e.g. Engle Merry, "Uncertainties," supra
note 2. Arguably, it is necessary to evaluate the new possibilities against emerging structural
constraints that new forms of imperialism subsequently introduced in those societies.
90. See also ibid; Engle Merry, "Law and Colonialism," supra note 2.
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of conceptualizing structural autonomy in economic relations between societies
and of anchoring politics and culture to the materiality of societies everywhere.
In other words, the challenge is to create the conditions in which real diversity
can flourish and innovative socio-legal frameworks of analysis can be devised that
are capable of sustaining this diversity in everyday life.
V. CONCLUSION
There are two impulses that drive the development of law in the Third World. One
consists of the economic interests of capitalism; the other of the institutional and
social infrastructures necessary for economic actors to operate. In the First World,
both of these impulses are internal to the historically constituted societies within
which capitalism arose. The dynamics of the social transformation were analyzed in
Karl Marx's writings and later in Marxist literature, and inform a rich and diverse
critique of capitalist transformation in the First World.91 What Jiirgen Habermas
refers to as "system" (meaning the economic, legal, institutional, and scientific
logics of modern society) and "lifeworld" (which encircles "system" and provides the
socio-cultural conditions, including language) both exist in unity as society or, rather,
Western societies. 2 The distinction made by Habermas is an analytical one.
In the Third World, there is a spatial and historical rupture between the
economic impulse generated by the production relations in the centres of
capitalism and the alien lifeworld in the Third World where the economy must
operate without a shared intersubjective order. In other words, there is a
spatio-temporal rupture between system and lifeworlds as a result of imperialism:
capitalism's expansionist external dimension. This disjuncture characterizes
Society in the Third World. Law reifies the disjuncture. This is not the same
thing as centre and periphery in World Systems approaches or what David
Harvey analyzes as different logics of capital and territory,93 but rather it is about
differentiating between the internal dimensions of capitalism constituted by
subordination of classes within society, and the external dimensions of capitalism
constituted by colonialism, expansionism and their subordination of societies
qua societies. Class, production, colonial relations, and expansionist governance
91. For the social and legal processes in the transformation of labour as a commodity, see
Polanyi, supra note 20. For the constitutive role of law in capitalist relations in society, see
Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law (New York:
Routledge, 1993).
92. Supra note 4.
93. The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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are organized through directionally opposite processes in capitalist-internal and
imperialist-external dimensions of capitalist development. 'The result is two
different modes of constitution of societies that produce distinct properties,
attributes, features, and internal and external dynamics that we recognize as First
and Third Worlds.94 Legal concepts and categories are integral to this process.
They hold out the key to explanations for the continued reproduction of unequal
relations between societies qua societies, a problem at the heart of global justice
in the contemporary world.
The national liberation struggles of the twentieth century overestimated
political sovereignty and formal legal statehood. The post-independence
experience has brought about a deep awareness that structural autonomy cannot
be achieved solely through political sovereignty and formal legal statehood. The
post-independence period has highlighted the significance of history and
geography, capitalism and imperialism, and nature and culture for the problems
of the contemporary world. Legal studies, including critical legal studies, tend to
take the conceptual vocabulary of law at face value. The result is a philosophical
impasse imposed by the epistemologies of Modernism and Enlightenment. It is
to this impasse that TWSLS must pay serious attention if it is to remain critically
engaged in a transformative social process for freedom and emancipation.
As Zygmunt Bauman argues, postmodernism in philosophy is closely tied
to the transformations in the stage of capitalism in the post-World War II era.95
The emphasis on culture and context in recent theoretical developments provides
valuable tools to deconstruct the philosophical resources that provide capitalism
and imperialism with the resilience they have shown. Postcolonialism, as Aijaz
Ahmad and others argue, takes its philosophical cues from postmodernism.96
TWSLS challenges us to move beyond deconstruction at the empirical and
phenomenological levels and to innovate conceptual and philosophical resources
that help us transcend the constraints of philosophical liberalism in ways that
take freedom and emancipation in philosophy and theory seriously. In legal and
social theory, it challenges us to find ways of speaking about global justice and
law in the Third World in ways that anchor the Third World to realities at all
94. For the distinctions between colonialism, neo-colonialism, and postcolonialism, see Radha
D'Souza, "Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism, Post Colonialism" in Mervyn Hartwig, ed,
Dictionary of Critical Realism (New York: Routledge, 2007).
95. Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987).
96. Aijaz Ahmad, "Postcolonial Theory and the 'Post-' Condition" (1997) 33 Socialist Register
353. See also Arif Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global
Capitalism" (1994) 20 Crit Inquiry 328.
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levels: ontological, structural, and empirical. Philosophical questions cannot be
resolved by sociological analysis alone; they must be resolved philosophically.
For social theory to attempt to find answers to inequities of colonialism and
imperialism within the same level of philosophical consciousness that brought
about Modernism, Enlightenment, and capitalism is to abandon the struggle for
justice altogether. Equally, if dualism and binary categories dominate Western
philosophy, as critical theory is at pains to point out, there is nothing stopping
us from looking to other philosophical traditions for answers to the problems of
our times.
These reflections on methodology in TWSLS raise questions that quickly
transcend Third World issues and call into question assumptions in social theory
more generally. The questions raised here are big ones by any reckoning, big
enough to warrant a research program to put TWSLS on more solid theoretical
foundations. This article has hinted at what such a research program might look
like. It is not possible within the space of a single article to develop an alterna-
tive methodology. To attempt to provide quick-fix solutions would risk reducing
embedded questions with deep roots in social theory to banalities. Besides, the
nature of the questions posed in this article call for sustained engagement with
the wider scholarly community. Nevertheless, it may be possible to identify a set
of methodological sensitivities that TWSLS scholars could be aware of when
approaching specific themes or issues about law in Third World societies.
First, it is important to recognize that there is something called Society. Both
law and society need to be problematized in TWSLS. Understandings of society
must be differentiated at ontological, structural, and empirical levels and accounted
for in analyses of concrete problems. The recognition that at the ontological
level human life is contingent on Society calls for interrogation of the assumptions
of sociological theories about structures, agents, and social transformations.
At the empirical level, it calls for investigation of the specific geo-historical
conjunctures of the relations between natures, social structures, and peoples that give
to particular societies their specific attributes and properties. The questions for
TWSLS must therefore encompass properties and attributes of the societies in
question as well as the natural and social relations that give to that society its
specific attributes and properties. In attempting to do so, disciplinary boundaries,
traditions, and vocabularies present problems or render their existence opaque.
Greater reflection is called for on the ways in which disciplinary boundaries
present a problem in TWSLS.
Second, if concepts develop within and in response to geo-historical
processes, how may we recognize this and yet communicate with each other?
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Had I written this article using the language of Jaina or Buddhist philosophy,
for example, I could have made the same arguments, though they would have
been comprehensible to very few, even in the Third World. The Orientalist
critique in the 196 0s and 1970s deconstructed the reasons for and ramifications
of Orientalism." It is necessary to move beyond that now. At the empirical level,
whatever the historical reasons for it, we have inherited a vocabulary that is in
circulation and that is not of our choosing. Nevertheless, the awareness that
deconstruction has provided must lead to greater reflection on what is entailed in
the use of the vocabulary. Communication is necessarily a social and collective act.
Transformations of vocabularies occur only through transformative engagement.
In retrospect, did the Enlightenment not change the meanings of society, rights,
and so many other terms through sustained engagements with the concepts? If it
did, then can a more reflexive TWSLS not transform meanings and vocabulary
in more emancipatory ways? For example, in this article I have used terms, phrases,
and concepts drawn from Marxist and critical theories to articulate wider concerns
about approaches in TWSLS, and in doing I have sought to provide a different
inflection on those terms and meanings.
Third, what does it mean to be 'non-dualist' when the world is full of diversity?
The challenge here is not to stop at description or indeed presentation of the
thesis and the antithesis in any problem, but also, simultaneously, to interrogate the
common grounds they share. Such an approach calls for reframing the questions
in ways that allow the interrogation of a problem to go beyond dualist framings.
The types of answers we get depend, often, on how we frame the question. In the
Jaina tradition, for example, a problem is first presented from a range of perceptions
that exist about it in the empirical world. The inquiry does not ask which of these
is true or false, or which one is better (dualist), but rather it moves on to the next
level of reality by asking the non-dualist question, "What must be the nature
of reality in this instance if there are all these different perceptions, all of which
are true and co-exist?" What is human freedom in the contemporary world, for
example, where global solidarity movements critique the use of human rights for
imperialist agendas (instrumentalist critique), imperialist institutions use human
rights for domination (normative critique), and where both are real and co-exist?
Fourth, postmodern deconstruction has generated recognition of diverse
philosophical traditions. For example, it is difficult to envisage any serious scholarly
argument today that claims that the Greco-Roman-Christian intellectual tradition
97. Edward Said's works were perhaps the most influential in deconstructing Orientaism. See
Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1991); Also see Edward Said, Culture and
Imperialism (London:Vintage, 1994).
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is intrinsically superior to all others. This recognition has opened up a rich and
varied conceptual repertoire that is widely available to scholars. The challenge
is to actually dip into it so as to develop conceptual resources needed for social
transformations. It is possible, for example, to argue that while Marxism provides
valuable tools for a critique of capitalism, something more is needed to realize the
aspirations of a just and egalitarian world-socialism, if that is what we want to
call such a world-and further, that we may need to look elsewhere, outside the
Western tradition, for conceptual resources to build such a society. Here, Marxism
and indigenous traditions both have their value and contributions to make.
The purpose of this article has been a limited one: to open up a sub-field in
socio-legal studies by identifying methodological problems in the approaches to
TWSLS. The reflections are informed by my practical experiences as an activist
lawyer in a Third World context and a legal academic in a First World context.98
Whether this call for a new research agenda for TWSLS will be another call in
the wilderness or whether it will generate responses from critical scholars, time
alone can tell.
98. For more specific examples of the tensions between law in practice and law in theory, see
D'Souza, Krishna Waters, supra note 21 at 3-12.
